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Customer orientation in an Australian public service agency and its 
effect on public service motives: Developing a research study 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Australian public service has experienced dramatic changes during the last few decades. 
One of the changes is the push for public servants to behave in accordance with private 
sector principles, such as customer service orientation. This paper is developing a research 
study that aims to analyse the motivational forces that enable (or disable) the behavioural 
changes of public servants and what impact (if any) those changes have on traditional public 
service motives. The study intends to use an extended expectancy-valence model together with 
a public service motive measurement scale to identify if there are relationships between 
motivational forces, customer service oriented behaviour and public service motives. 
  
Keywords: public sector reform, new public management, motivation 
 
CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
The Australian public service has experienced dramatic changes during the last few decades. 
The increase in globalisation, technological advancements and the discontent of the public 
with government services have contributed to a public service reform movement in most 
OECD countries including Australia (Claver, Llopis, Gasco, Molina and Conca, 1999; Valle, 
1999; Armbruester, 2005). The rationale behind this reform is a ‘new public management 
aligning public procedures to seemingly more successful private enterprise business practices 
to create a public service that is focussed on quality, that is flexible and responsive to 
customers and that provides choices of non-standardised services’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1993:15). The Australian government has introduced wide-sweeping changes to the public 
service by privatising, contracting out and establishing agencies that have to compete to 
provide services with other government departments and in some instances with private 
business. In many departments new management structures and procedures have been put in 
place to help with the transformation to a customer oriented model including a performance 
management system emphasising team work, high quality customer service, providing 
tangible results, innovation and flexibility (Mascarenhas, 1993; Brown, Ryan and Parker, 
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2000; Grant, O'Donnell and Shields, 2003; Kernaghan, 2003). As Grant et al. write, ‘a 
declared purpose of this new paradigm has been to transform the image of the Australian 
Public Service (APS) line employee from...public servant to…strategic contributor’ 
(2003:247) If Grant et al. (2003) are correct in their claim then a number of important 
questions need to be answered: What motivates a public servant to become a strategic 
contributor? That is, what motivates public servants to behave according to the new paradigm 
of customer service orientation (CSO)? And then, what effect does acting according to the 
new paradigm have on more traditional public service motives?    
 
Thus, the aim of this paper is to describe the development of a research study that will attempt 
to answer those questions. The results will be important in several ways. First, it will provide 
insights for the public service on the motivational forces at play in a particular agency now. 
Second, it will throw light on how these forces may vary from agency branch to agency 
branch. Finally, it will indicate whether and how traditional public sector motives are affected 
by the new model of public sector behaviour. 
 
MOTIVATION 
 
To answer the first question it is necessary to identify the motivational tools in force to shift 
the public servant’s behaviour to that of a strategic contributor. One of the procedures to help 
with the transformation to the new business paradigm in the APS has been the 
implementation of a performance management system based on private sector principles, such 
as performance-based pay. This system includes an individual performance appraisal process 
aimed at helping to shift the focus of the public servant from simply following procedures to 
embracing customer service, flexibility, innovation, accountability and individual 
responsibility (Public Service Agency Development Agreement, 2003-2005). A stated aim of 
this performance appraisal system is to provide opportunities for bi-annual feedback and a 
link to remuneration and training and development. Remuneration in the APS under the new 
Page 1 to 15 ANZAM 2009  
4 
 
system is based on pay-bands with several increments within the bands and work availability 
barriers between the bands. Training and development is to be provided according to 
‘business needs’ as determined by the team-leader/manager and the employee. The 
performance appraisal system is thus based on private sector models that emphasise extrinsic 
motivators such as pay and career progression (Jurkiewicz, Massey and Brown, 1998). So the 
first question becomes: ‘to what extent do these and other elements of an APS employee’s 
employment situation help them to act in ways consistent with CSO?       
 
The second question requires a closer look at specific traditional motives that appear to be 
prevalent in the public service. According to public service motives literature (Perry and 
Wise, 1990; Perry, 1996; Brewer and Selden, 1998; Wright, 2001; Le Grand, 2003; Lee, 
2007; Taylor, 2007) public servants have different reward values from those of private sector 
employees. Public servants typically have strong feelings about the norms and moral values in 
the public service and are guided by a public service ethic or public service motives (PSM) 
emphasising internal motivators such as a desire to serve the public interest, to pursue a 
common good and a willingness to help others (Wright, 2001; Taylor, 2007). This willingness 
to place the public interest above personal gain has been the object of several research studies 
indicating a positive relationship between public service motives and work and social 
outcomes (Brewer and Selden, 1998; Taylor, 2007).  
 
Vroom’s expectancy theory of motivation 
 
To tackle the first question, the link between APS line employee’ motivation and their CSO 
behaviours, it makes sense to use a well-established framework for understanding motivation: 
Vroom’s expectancy theory. Vroom’s expectancy theory has been successfully used by 
researchers over many years and in diverse contexts to analyse the relationship between 
desired work outcomes and demonstrated behaviour (Van Eerde and Thierry, 1995; Ambrose 
and Kulik, 1999). The traditional expectancy-valence theory (Vroom, 1964) proposes that 
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employees’ behaviour is based on rational and goal-directed decisions. It suggests that 
employees will select behaviour they perceive to be beneficial for the achievement of certain 
valued rewards. Vroom (1964) developed an equation that expresses this proposition as 
follows: 
Force to perform act = Expectancy that appropriate performance will be followed by 
rewards x Valence of rewards (F=EV).  
 
Vroom’s basic model shows the dependency of motivation on a person’s expectancy of 
attaining rewards, the ability to perform and the rewards to be gained. Thus, motivation to 
behave in a certain way is influenced by the elements in the expectancy/valence model 
meaning that if either of the E or V elements has a negative or zero value, the employee will 
not be motivated to expend any force towards the performance outcome (behaviour) or 
reward outcome. The basic theory has had some criticism (Kopelman and Thompson, 1976; 
Van Eerde and Thierry, 1995; Steers, Mowday and Shapiro, 2004; Kominis and Emmanuel, 
2007). As Kopelman and Thompson (1976) state, the ‘validity of the expectancy theory 
ultimately depends on the manner in which the theory is tested’ (1976:255) and ‘only when 
those factors which complicate the prediction of work motivation and job performance are 
taken into account will researchers be able to determine the validity of expectancy theory’ 
(1976:256). 
 
The extended expectancy-valence model 
The extended expectancy-valence model proposed by Kominis and Emmanuel (2007) in their 
study of 200 plus middle managers in a large, successful company in the financial services 
sector, adds just such a new variable to the effort-reward relationship in Vroom’s basic 
model. Kominis and Emmanuel believe the perceived accuracy of performance measures 
could affect employees’ expectancy of attaining rewards. Their extended expectancy-valence 
model is summarised in Fig 1 (see page 13).   
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The E and V elements of the extended model can be explained as follows.  
 Expectancy: The expectancy (E) of achieving appropriate performance depends on 
three factors, some of which are outside the employee’s control (Vroom, 1964). The first is an 
employee’s capacity to attain required performance standards, thus E P. For instance, the 
satisfactory completion of a customer enquiry may depend on the availability of a computer 
system, the amount of training or technical skills the employee was given prior to the enquiry, 
or other factors. The strength of the expectancy is thus indicated by the perceived likelihood 
of the performance outcome eventuating (Vroom, 1964). The second dimension of E – the 
new variable introduced by Kominis and Emmanuel – is the perceived accuracy of the 
measures used, thus P  EP. For instance, an employee’s performance may not be measured 
accurately because his or her supervisor is not familiar enough with what he or she does, or is 
subject to various forms of error, such as halo error, recency error and so on. The third 
dimension of E is the perceived dependency of rewards on performance, thus EP ER. For 
instance, an employee may be promised a reward if he or she achieves the appropriate 
performance, but the person who promised it may not have the power to grant the reward, or 
budget cuts or other circumstances may mean to promise is not kept. The EP ER 
relationship is sometimes referred to as instrumentality. All three factors will influence the 
behaviour decision an employee will make amongst a number of alternatives. Over time the 
expectancies will either strengthen or weaken as ‘actual events provide information which 
influences the individual’s perceptions’ (Nadler and Lawler III, 1989:7).   
 
Valence: The valence (V) element in the extended model distinguishes between 
extrinsic valence (EV) and intrinsic valence (IV). EV refers to extrinsic rewards that are 
recognised as rewards administered by the agency such as pay and promotion as a 
consequence of performing an activity, whereas IV is referring to those rewards that relate to 
feelings ‘produced inherently from the activity itself’ (Kominis and Emmanuel, 2007:54). 
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Intrinsic rewards thus include feelings of achievement, self-actualisation and competence; and 
in relation to the public service feelings associated with having the opportunity to serve the 
public interest, a sense of ‘civic duty’ and having ‘compassion’ to help others.         
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Question 1: Motivating factor  tendency to act in a CSO way 
To investigate the first research question, I plan to adopt Kominis’ and Emmanuel’s extended 
expectancy-valence model to determine the factors that influence the tendency of public 
servants to behave in a CSO way (see Fig 2, red circle).   
A survey of a public service agency at different locations within Australia will provide 
insights why some public servants have a greater tendency to act in a CSO way and why 
others do not behave in that way. Qualitative work already done suggests that there is greater 
capacity in some locations than others to offer the kinds of extrinsic rewards the new 
paradigm relies on. The model adopted from Kominis and Emmanuel (2007) will be used to 
devise survey questions for each of the three E elements of the extended expectancy-valence 
model. The first element of the model refers to the relationship between the perceived 
attainability of standards and the tendency to act in a CSO way and will elicit insights into 
how public servants feel about their ability to reach the performance standards of their agency 
if they put in a great deal of effort, and whether they feel they have the opportunity, the 
necessary knowledge and training to behave in a CSO way. The next dimension of the E 
element will deal with the relationship of the perceived accuracy of measures and the 
tendency to act in a CSO way. This will capture issues about performance evaluation, its 
frequency, the perceived accuracy of the measures and any equity issues that may arise in 
regard to performance management. The third dimension of E will probe the relationship 
between the perceived dependency of rewards and the tendency to act in a CSO way, that is, 
whether public servants feel that the reward they receive actually depends on the evaluated 
performance as assessed by the agency.  
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The two reward dimensions will identify the relationship between the perceived value of 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards and the tendency to act in a CSO way. Kominis and Emmanuel 
(2007) had an innovative approach to considering the rewards dimension in their study. They 
asked their respondents to identify as many as possible of the different rewards associated 
with their job and then to rate each of those rewards according to the importance they placed 
on them. This has the advantage that rewards that may not have been anticipated in standard 
lists could be generated by the participants themselves. I could pursue a similar approach. 
Alternatively, the survey for my research study could provide a list of possible rewards, both 
extrinsic and intrinsic asking respondents to add any additional ones they believed were not 
included and then to rate the importance of each of all of them.  
 
Another measurement scale will be developed to capture the desired behaviours that enable a 
public servant to act in a CSO way. Kominis and Emmanuel (2007), whose study focused on 
managerial behaviours, used a list of job functions such as planning, investigating, 
supervising to rate their middle manager respondents on a 7-point scale. As with the options 
for probing rewards, there are various ways I could set about measuring ‘tendency to act in a 
CSO way’. One would be to follow Kominis and Emmanuel’s approach, but instead of using 
a basic list of managerial job functions, use a basic list of CSO behaviours from the 
documents used by the agency in question. These might appear, for example, as ‘providing 
customer service, displaying qualities of flexibility, displaying qualities of innovation, being 
accountable and taking responsibility’. Another would be to use a modified measurement 
scale such as the selling orientation-customer orientation scale (SOCO) developed by Saxe 
and Weitz (1982).   
 
 
Question 2: Tendency to act in a CSO way  public service motives 
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The second question will identify if there is a relationship between the tendency to act in a 
CSO way and traditional public service motives (PSM) as stated by Perry and Wise (1990) 
(see Fig 2, blue circle). Perry and Wise (1990) identified three PSM; rational, norm-based and 
affective. The rational PSM is based on participation in the process of policy formation, 
commitment to a public program due to personal identification with it and the advocacy for a 
special or private interest (Perry and Wise, 1990). Norm-based motives include a desire to 
serve the public interest, loyalty to duty and social equity whereas the affective motives are a 
commitment to a program because of personal beliefs about its social importance and general 
benevolence. Based on those PSM Perry (1996) used confirmatory factor analysis to develop 
a measurement scale with four (4) dimensions. The dimensions are based on the three motives 
identified in his earlier work and refer to public policy making, public interest and 
compassion with the addition of self sacrifice as the fourth dimension on the grounds that it 
‘has had a historical connection to how we think about public service’ (Perry, 1996 p 20).  
 
The theoretical and empirical foundations for PSM as developed by Perry and Wise (1990) 
and tested by Perry (1996) have been used extensively by academics researching PSM 
(Brewer, Selden, 1998; Brewer et al., 2000; Steijn, 2004; 2008; Taylor 2007; 2008; Grant, 
2008; Vandenabeele, 2008). Taylor (2007) uses Perry’s PSM construct to test the relationship 
between PSM and three work outcomes; organisational commitment, job satisfaction and job 
motivation in the Australian public service. Her study investigates what effect each PSM 
dimension has on the three work outcomes in the Australian public service and also to 
identify if some dimensions play a more dominant role than others. Her findings show that 
PSM in the Australian government has a positive relationship to the three work outcomes and 
that a positive work environment contributes to a rise in PSM whereas perceptions of 
bureaucratic red tape indicate a decline in PSM (Taylor, 2007). She further concludes that 
some motives are vulnerable to influence by external factors and that altruistic motives are in 
need of encouragement and support.  
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Taylor’s (2007) measurement subscales consists of questions developed by Perry (1996) with 
some revised statements to fit the Australian public service context. As such her PSM 
construct will be used to identify to what extent PSM exist in the chosen agency and whether 
there is a relationship between the tendency to act in a CSO way and PSM (see Fig 2, blue 
circle). Taylor’s (2007) self-sacrifice subscale consists of eight (8) questions, with examples 
such as ‘I believe in putting the needs of my community before self’ and ‘I feel people should 
give back to society more than they get from it’. Measuring normative motives (commitment 
to public interest) identifies five (5) questions and asks about such things as ‘I consider public 
service a civic duty’ and a reversed question ‘it is hard to get me genuinely interested in what 
is going on in my community’. In regards to affective motives (compassion) the eight (8) 
questions include: ‘to me, being Australian includes seeing to the welfare of others’ and 
another reversed question ‘I am not particularly moved by the plight of the underprivileged’. 
The last sub-set of questions is about rational motives (attraction to policy making) and has 
three (3) questions, one of which is ‘the give and take of public policy making appeals to me’.  
 
The next step is to devise a survey that measures the three identified constructs of motivation, 
tendency to act in a CSO way and public service motives and then test for relationships 
between those constructs as indicated in Fig 2 by using regression analysis.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The study promises to be of value in both empirical and theoretical terms. At a theoretical 
level, we will know more about whether a blanket approach to motivation according to a 
single new paradigm of CSO is equally effective for all public sector employees of a 
particular agency. Further, we will know more about the specific factors such as agency 
location that may influence any variations in the system’s effectiveness. Finally, we will also 
know more about whether the new paradigm has hidden costs, no effect, or actually enhances 
traditional PSM. At a theoretical level, we will understand more about the capacity of 
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expectancy theory to explain motivation by testing it in a new way and in a new context as 
Kopelman and Thompson (1976) recommend. 
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Figure 1: Extended Expectancy-Valence Model 
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Adapted from Kominis & Emmanuel, 2007, p54 (shading added by author) 
E – Effort, P – Performance, EP – Expected Performance, ER – Expected Reward, 
EV – Extrinsic rewards, IV – Intrinsic rewards 
 
 
Figure 2: Expectancy-Valence/CSO Behaviour/Public Service Motives Model   
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